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Abstract 
 
At the stage of international post-Kyoto negotiations, the adoption of ambitious public 
policies raises an increasing interest, as society has a whole is more concerned by the scale of 
damages and the potential irreversibility linked to climate change. The introduction of a tradable 
permits market in Europe on January 1, 2005, in order to provide incentives to Member-States 
to take early abatement measures, may be seen as a decisive first step towards that direction. 
The creation of the EU ETS has indeed revealed the key role played by the European Union in 
the preservation of the global public good that constitutes the climate. This article reviews the 
market rules of the European carbon market during 2005-2007. More particularly, it synthesizes 
theoretical and empirical analyses of banking and borrowing provisions, price drivers and risk-
hedging strategies attached to tradable quotas, which were introduced to cover the CO2 
emissions of around 10,600 installations in Europe.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been created on January 
1, 2005 to reduce by 8% CO2 emissions in the European Union by 2012, relative to 1990 
emissions levels. This aggregated emissions reduction target in the EU has been achieved 
following differentiated agreements, sharing efforts between Member States based on their 
potential of decarbonization of their economy. The introduction of a tradable permits market has 
been decided to help Member States in achieving their targets in the Kyoto Protocol, entered 
into force on February 2005 following the ratification of Iceland, and which aims at reducing 
the emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHG) considered as the main cause of climate change. 
Among the Members of Annex B, these agreements include CO2 emissions reductions for 38 
industrialized countries, with a global reduction of CO2 emissions by 5.2% (see Table 2). These 
agreements have been fostered by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC (2000)) which recognizes three principles: the precautionary principle1, the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities2, and the principle of the right to 
development3. 174 countries, Australia being the latest on December 3, 2007, have ratified the 
Protocol, with the notorious exception of the United States. The first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol goes from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012. 
This political will has been reaffirmed at the international level during the UN 
Conference that took place in Bali on December 2007, where a roadmap of negotiations that 
should lead to a post-Kyoto agreement has been adopted. The United States are expected to 
cooperate, given the initiatives of emissions reduction introduced at the regional level4. The next 
round of negotiations will take place in Copenhagen on December 2009. As the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM)5 has revealed the strong potential of CO2 emissions abatement 
in countries such as Brazil, China or India, the main issue of these negotiations is linked to 
achieving the largest possible level of cooperation, in order to avoid the well-known free riders 
behaviours, and to preserve the global public good that constitutes the climate. On this matter, 
                                                 
1
 Scientific uncertainty concerning the precise impacts of climate change does not justify delaying 
immediate action. 
2
 Each signatory country recognizes the impact of its GHG emissions on climate change. The most 
industrialized countries carry a heavier historical responsibility, given their prior GHG intensive 
development, which translates into tighter targets. 
3
 Action will be taken in accordance with the economic development of each country. 
4
 We may cite the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which contains several GHG reduction 
objectives in nine North-Eastern States, and the Assembly Bill 32 in California which aims at reducing 
CO2 emissions by 25% by 2020 relative to 1990 emissions levels, and by 80% by 2050. At the federal 
level, the Climate Stewardship Act introduced by the Senator Lieberman- McCain did not find sufficient 
political support to become legally binding. 
5
 According to the article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, CDM projects consist in achieving GHG emissions 
reduction in non-Annex B countries. After validation, the UNFCCC delivers credits that may be used by 
Annex B countries for use towards their compliance position. 
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the European Union has clearly adopted a leadership position, which contrasts with its early 
reluctance during the first steps of the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
On January 2008, the European Commission has extended the scope of its action 
against global warming by 2020 with the “energy and climate change” package. This package 
aims at reducing GHG emissions by 20%, at increasing the use of renewable energy in energy 
consumption to 20%, and at saving 20% of energy by increasing energy efficiency. The 
European carbon market, which has currently entered its Phase II (2008-2012), has been 
confirmed until 2020 also. Its scope has been extended to major sectors in terms of CO2 
emissions growth, such as aviation and petro-chemical industries during 2013-2020. These 
repeated public policies in favour of climate protection aim at correcting the negative externality 
attached to the release of uncontrolled GHG emissions in the atmosphere and thus, according to 
the well-known principle in economics, at internalizing the social cost of carbon. At the same 
time, these initiatives reveal the difficulty to create a scarcity condition regarding CO2 
emissions. These emissions indeed were not limited in the pre-existing institutional 
environment, and thus could not be considered as a scarce resource.  
The European Union being at the forefront of environmental regulation dedicated to 
climate policies, this article reviews the market rules of the European carbon market during 
Phase I. It investigates the role played by the regulator, among the various choices at stake when 
creating a tradable permits market, on the behaviour of firms. Thus, this article contributes to 
the literature on the “birth” of the European carbon market (Convery et al. (2008), Convery 
(2009), Ellerman and Buchner (2008)), by focusing our attention on the study of several key 
provisions in a moving institutional context, and by identifying learning effects. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the key design 
issues of the EU ETS. Section 3 examines the effects of banking restrictions between 2007 and 
2008. Section 4 discusses the price fundamentals of CO2 allowances. Section 5 details market 
participants’ risk behaviour. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Key Design Issues of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
 This section reviews the scope, allocation methodologies, calendar, transactions levels, 
and penalties associated to non-compliance on the EU ETS. 
 
2.1 Scope 
The Directive 2003/87/CE defines the scope of the EU ETS6. This scheme concerns 
around 10,600 installations in Europe, mainly in the production sectors of combustion, iron and 
steel, pulp and paper, refineries, and cement. Installations in these sectors are eligible to 
                                                 
6
 See the European Commission Environment DG website at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/ 
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emissions trading when their energy consumption is superior to the threshold of 20MWTh. This 
threshold has been decided by the European Commission so as to target the most energy-
intensive industries during the first Phases of the program. This choice has been justified 
initially by the will of the European Commission to minimize political resistance, and to enforce 
a quick implementation of the scheme in 2005. To increase the environmental performance of 
the scheme, the debate is now centred on the progressive extension of its scope. The EU ETS 
Review7 has revealed that other sectors will soon be included, such as aviation as of 2013. 
 
2.2 Allocation 
 
The CO2 emissions reduction target of each Member State has been converted into 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs). Each government is in charge of deciding the amount of 
quotas available for trading, after negotiating with industrials, and after the validation by the 
European Commission. The role of the Environment DG is central in this scheme in order to 
harmonize NAPs among Member States, and to recommend stricter NAPs validation criteria. 
The NAPs submissions may be rejected by the European Commission, and sent back to Member 
States for revision before the final decision. The sum of NAPs determines the number of quotas 
distributed to installations in the EU ETS. 2.2 billion of quotas per year have been distributed 
during 2005-2007. 2.08 billion of quotas per year will be distributed during 2008-2012, which 
corresponds to a more restrictive allocation, given some changes in the scope of the market with 
the inclusion of new Member States. Figures 1 and 2 represent, respectively, the repartition of 
quotas (in million tons of CO2) between Member States during the commitment periods 2005-
2007 and 2008-20128. Germany, Poland, Italy, the UK and Spain total around two thirds of 
allowances distributed. 
The allocation methodology consists in a free distribution of quotas in proportion of 
recent emissions, also known as grandfathering. With a value of around €20 per quota, the 
launch of the EU ETS corresponds to a net creation of wealth of around €40 billion. The 
environmental constraint during 2005-2007 has not been considered as sufficiently binding for 
most market observers, and the allocation methodology has been criticised for distributing rents 
to pre-existing market players, as some of them may make a net profit simply by selling their 
unused allowances. 
During 2005-2007, allowances distributed have more than covered verified emissions, 
with a net cumulated surplus of 156 million tons. This surplus has however decreased, going 
from 83 million tons in 2005 to 37 million tons in 2006, and finally 36 million tons in 2007. 
Emissions have increased by 0.4% in 2007 compared to 2006, and reached 2,043 million tons 
with respect to 2,080 million allowances distributed. 
                                                 
7
 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/reviewen.htm 
8
 The data comes from the Mission Climat Caisse des Depots, available at: http://www.caissedesdepots.fr 
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Figure 1: EU ETS National Allocation Plans - Phase 1 (2005-2007) 
Source: CITL (2007) and CDC (2006) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: EU ETS National Allocation Plans - Phase II (2008-2012) 
Source: CITL (2008) and CDC (2008) 
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2.3 Calendar 
 The EU ETS Phase I may be considered as a warm-up phase, during 2005-2007. Phase 
II corresponds to the commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. 2008- 2012. Phase III is 
supposed to correspond to a post-Kyoto agreement, i.e. 2013- 2020. During each of these 
Phases, the delivery of allowances is made on a yearly basis, and follows a precise calendar: 
• on February 28 of year N, European operators receive their allocation for the 
commitment year N; 
• March 31 of year N is the deadline for the submission of the verified emissions report 
during year N−1, from each installation to the European Commission; 
• April 30 of year N is the deadline for the restitution of quotas utilized by operators 
during year N − 1; 
• May 15 of year N corresponds to the deadline of the official publication by the 
European Commission of verified emissions for all installations covered by the EU ETS 
during year N − 1. 
The annual frequency of verified emissions, imposed by the European Commission, 
corresponds thus to a central event, structuring the diffusion of reliable information at the 
aggregated level on the European carbon market. 
 
2.4 Transactions 
One allowance exchanged on the EU ETS corresponds to one ton of CO2 released in 
the atmosphere, and is called a European Union Allowance (EUA). Allowance trading is 
recorded electronically by national registries. The information contained in these registries is 
centralized by the European Commission in the European registry, called the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL)9. The CITL contains exhaustive information on CO2 
emissions for all installations covered by the EU ETS, and is used to account the compliance 
position of each firm. The information contained in the CITL is available at the installation 
level. As a first step, data compilation appears necessary to reconstruct the ownership structures 
between subsidiaries and parent companies, which yield to a more precise analysis for the 
evaluation of the scheme (McGuinness and Trotignon (2007)). 
To comply with their emissions target, installations may exchange quotas either over-
the-counter, or through brokers and market places. Bluenext, formerly Powernext Carbon, is the 
market place dedicated to CO2 allowance trading based in Paris. The European Climate 
Exchange is the market place based in London, which is leader for derivatives products. 
NordPool represents the market place common to Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and is 
based in Oslo. The price of products exchanged on these market places are strongly correlated, 
                                                 
9
 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets 
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which is conform to other market places like stock markets. Moreover, the European carbon 
market is characterised by an increasing sophistication of financial instruments using a quota of 
CO2 as the underlying asset, and the development of option prices or swaps10. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Volume exchanged for the spot price valid during 2005-2007 from June 24, 2005 
to April 25, 2008 in tons of CO2 
Source: BlueNext 
 
 
Figure 3 indicates the total volume of allowances exchanged in the EU ETS during 
Phase I. This graph reveals that the number of transactions has been multiplied by a factor four 
between 2005 and 2006, going from 262 to 809 million tons. This increasing liquidity of the 
market has been confirmed in 2007, where the volume of transactions recorded equals 1.5 
billion tons. This peak of transactions may be explained by the growth of the number of 
contracts valid during Phase II, with delivery dates going from December 2008 to December 
2012, which amount for 4% of total exchanges in 2005, and 85% in 2007. These transactions 
reached €5.97 billion in 2005, €15.2 billion in 2006, and €24.1 billion in 2007, thereby 
confirming the fact that the EU ETS represents the largest emissions trading scheme to date in 
terms of transactions. 
 
                                                 
10
 Note there exists also financial instrument with a CDM credit on the secondary market as the 
underlying asset, stemming from the Kyoto Protocol and fungible with quotas traded in the EU ETS with 
a maximum limit of around 13.4%. 
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2.5 Penalties 
During 2005-2007, if an installation does not meet its emissions target during the 
compliance year under consideration, the penalty is equal to €40/ton in excess, plus the 
restitution of one allowance during the next compliance period. During 2008-2012, this amount 
corresponds to €100/ton, following the same principle. 
Following this review of the institutional context on the European carbon market, we 
detail in the next section the allowance price development and associated banking strategies. 
 
3 Banking Provisions 
 
This section details the banking borrowing provisions adopted in the EU ETS. 
Intertemporal emissions trading allows firms to smooth their emissions overtime, and offers a 
greater flexibility in order to meet the emissions target. Therefore, banking and borrowing allow 
firms to achieve their depolluting objectives at least cost, if these provisions are adequately 
configured by the regulators and their effects has been sufficiently discussed, evaluated and 
understood. Let us first examine the allowance price development in the EU ETS during 2005-
2007. 
 
3.1 Price Developments 
  
 
 
Figure 4: EUA Spot and Futures Prices from July 2005 to May 2007 
Source: BlueNext and ECX 
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In Figure 4, we may observe that from January to July 2005, CO2 prices increased due 
to the perceived scarcity of allowances: demand comes mainly from power producers, while 
most other market participants did not take advantage of buying/selling carbon allowances. 
From August 2005 to March 2006, the volume of transactions increased, driving the equilibrium 
allowance price up to €25/ton of CO2. Demand continues to come primarily from power 
operators, and increased during the winter due to the rise of energy prices – especially gas 
prices. During April to May 2006, the allowance market encountered a sharp drop in prices of 
all maturities, due to the first compliance report by the European Commission revealing that the 
market was oversupplied by approximately 4%. The allowance price is divided by a factor two 
within a window of four days only. Following this reversal of expectations from market 
operators, allowance prices stabilized around €15/ton of CO2 during June to September 2006. 
From October 2006 until the end of 2007, we finally observe a divorce between spot and futures 
prices of validity during Phases I (2005-2007) and II (2008-2012): while spot prices fell to 
€0.5/ton of CO2, futures prices remained in the range of 15 to €20/ton of CO2. The motives for 
such a disconnection between allowance prices of different maturities are explained in the next 
section. Since March 2007, allowance prices valid during 2008-2012 have stabilized over 
€20/ton of CO2, following the decision by the European Council to maintain the EU ETS at 
least until 2020, and the decision to enforce stricter validation criteria for NAPs II (Convery and 
Redmond (2007)). 
 
3.2 Banking Restrictions 
 On the EU ETS, allowances are valid during a specific compliance year. However, an 
installation may have banked allowances during year N to cover its emissions during year N+1, 
if years N and N +1 correspond to the same Phase. The same mechanism applies for allowances 
borrowed from year N + 1 in order to comply with the emissions target of the installation during 
year N. Thus, allowances banked or borrowed are fungible within the same Phase. However, 
allowances distributed during Phase I are not valid during Phase II. Allowances distributed 
during Phases II and III are fungible between the different Phases. 
 Phase I is characterized by a full intertemporal flexibility, like Phases II and III. Yet, 
given the simultaneity of the commitment periods between the Kyoto Protocol and Phase II, the 
intertemporal transfer of allowances has been strictly limited between Phases I and II, in effect 
banning the transfer of allowances between December 31, 2007 and January, 1, 2008. 
 Alberola and Chevallier (2009) develop a statistical analysis showing that the 
disconnection between Phase I prices, decreasing towards zero, and Phase II prices, stabilized 
around 20€/ton, may be explained by the restriction on the inter-period transfer of allowances 
enforced during Phase I. Indeed, the cost-of-carry relationship between EUA spot and futures 
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prices for delivery during Phase II does not hold after the enforcement of the inter-period 
banking restrictions around October 2006. 
The inefficiency of the EUA price signal to reflect correctly the social value of carbon 
until the end of Phase I may be explained by the restrictions enforced by Member-States 
concerning the transfer of quotas, banked or borrowed, from Phase I to Phase II. This sacrifice 
of the intertemporal flexibility mechanism may be interpreted by the will of the European 
Commission to limit the transfer of inefficiencies from the creation of the allowance market to 
Phase II, which simultaneously corresponds the Kyoto Protocol commitment period. Between 
Phases II and III of the EU ETS, the transfer of allowances has been authorized. Therefore, it 
appears possible to identify institutional learning effects between Phases I and II, as the early 
inefficiencies due to the youth of the European carbon market during 2005-2007 do not seem to 
have been transferred to the subsequent periods. 
Moreover, preliminary analyses of the 2005-2007 data concerning the extent of the use 
of banking in the EU ETS may be found in Ellerman and Trotignon (2008) and Chevallier et al. 
(2008). 
 To further develop our analysis of price developments in the EU ETS, we conduct in the 
next section a review of the main price fundamentals of EUAs during 2005-2007. 
 
4 CO2 Price Fundamentals 
 
This section focuses on the price fundamentals of CO2 allowances. These fundamentals 
are mainly linked to regulatory decisions, energy prices and extreme temperatures events 
(Christiansen et al. (2005)).  
 
4.1 Institutional Decisions 
First, it is worth noting that political and institutional decisions on the overall cap 
stringency have an impact on the carbon price setting through initial allocation. Also, any 
decision or announcement from regulators may induce changes in market players’ behaviour. 
From this perspective, official communications by the European Commission are essential to 
reach a better information flow on installations' net short/long positions11 (Ellerman and 
Buchner (2008)). 
Whereas on energy markets the question of price formation is closely related to 
commodity storage, on the EU ETS the essential issue is the expected “emission shortfall” 
during each compliance year. The emission shortfall, defined as the difference between verified 
emissions during the compliance year and allocated allowances, depends on the actual amount 
                                                 
11
 Note an installation is defined as short (long) when it records a deficit (surplus) of allowances allocated 
with respect to actual emissions. 
11 
 
of emissions abatements required (which are unknown but estimable based on reliable recent 
data) by the stringency of the cap (which is known). This information is publicly disclosed each 
year by the European Commission by mid-May as detailed in Section 2.3. It has a strong market 
effect on allowance price changes of all maturities, as it provides market participants with 
reliable information to update their expectations about future market developments. 
Alberola et al. (2008) develop an original method to identify structural breaks in the 
CO2 price series. They provide statistical evidence that two institutional events on April 2006, 
following the disclosure of 2005 verified emissions, and on October 2006, following the 
European Commission announcement of stricter Phase II, occurred during 2005-2007. Those 
events have a sharp effect on market participants’ expectations changes, and further allow 
isolating distinct energy and weather influences on carbon prices as discussed below. 
 
4.2 Energy Prices  
Second, energy prices are the most important price drivers on the short term of the EUA 
demand due to the ability of power generators to switch between their fuel inputs. This fuel-
switching behaviour at the installations level applies especially in the power sector, which was 
endowed with more than 50% of EUAs during 2005-2007. The EU ETS price formation is 
indeed largely influenced by the electricity power market, since its participants are the main 
traders on the carbon market. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Gas Zeebrugge and Coal CIF ARA Prices from July 2006 to June 2007 
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream 
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 Figure 5 shows the price development of natural gas and coal prices from July 2006 to 
June 2007. The natural gas price (in €/MWh) is the daily futures Month Ahead natural gas price 
negotiated on Zeebrugge Hub. The price of coal (coal in €/ton) is the daily coal futures Month 
Ahead price CIF ARA12. During 2005-07, natural gas prices exhibit strong volatility compared 
to coal prices. During the months of November-December 2005, natural gas prices soared to 
€50/MWh and steadily declined afterwards to €20/MWh during 2006, and to €10/MWh during 
the first quarter 2007. The competitiveness of natural gas compared to coal therefore improved 
during 2006 and the first quarter 2007 compared to the end of 2005. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Clean Spark Spread, Clean Dark Spread and Electricity Powernext Prices from 
July 2006 to June 2007 
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream 
 
Figure 6 shows the price development of the electricity price, as well as the clean dark 
and clean spark spreads from July 2006 to June 2007. The price of electricity Powernext (in 
€/MWh) is the contract of futures Month Ahead Base. To take into account abatement options 
for energy industrials and relative fuel prices, it appears also important to introduce two specific 
spreads13.  
                                                 
12
 CIF ARA denotes the price of coal inclusive of freight and insurance delivered to the large North West 
European ports, e.g. Amsterdam, Rotterdam or Antwerp. 
13
 As calculated by the Mission Climat of the Caisse des Depots for Tendances Carbone. The 
methodology is available on the website: 
13 
 
The Clean Dark Spread (in €/MWh) represents the difference between the price of 
electricity at peak hours and the price of coal used to generate that electricity, corrected for the 
energy output of the coal plant and the costs of CO2: 
)*1*( coalt
coal
EFpcoalelecspreaddarkclean +−=
ρ
 (1) 
with ρcoal the net thermal efficiency of a conventional coal-fired plant14, and EFcoal the CO2 
emissions factor of a conventional coal-fired power plant15. 
 The Clean Spark Spread (in €/MWh) represents the difference between the price of 
electricity at peak hours and the price of natural gas used to generate that electricity, corrected 
for the energy output of the gas-fired plant and the costs of CO2: 
)*1*( ngast
ngas
EFpngaselecspreadsparkclean +−=
ρ
 (2) 
with ρngas the net thermal efficiency of a conventional gas-fired plant16, and EFngas the CO2 
emissions factor of a conventional gas-fired power plant17. 
 During 2005-06, the use of coal appeared more profitable than gas. Since the beginning 
of 2007, the difference between the clean dark and clean spark spreads has been narrowing. 
This situation encourages consequently electric companies to decrease the use of coal to the 
profit of natural gas. 
Figure 7 shows the price development of brent prices from July 2005 to November 
2007. The oil price (in $/baril) is the daily brent crude futures Month Ahead price negotiated on 
the Intercontinental Futures Exchange. 
 Alberola et al. (2008) show that energy prices forecast errors have basically driven the 
CO2 price over 2005–2007, but their influences changed over the period depending on 
regulatory changes. High levels of natural gas lead power operators to realise a switch in fuel 
utilization from gas to coal. The natural gas price got higher from October 2005 to April 2006 
and thereby positively influenced the EUA price. As the most CO2-intensive variable, coal plays 
a negative role on carbon price changes: when confronted to a rise of the price of coal relative to 
other energy markets, firms have an incentive to adapt their energy mix towards less CO2-
intensive energy sources. Brent prices have a positive effect on EUA price changes, which 
channels through the natural gas price (Kanen (2006)). These energy influences on carbon 
prices are also in line with Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007)18. 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/IMG/pdf\_Document\_Methodologie\_Tendances\_Carbone\_EN\_V4-
2.pdf 
14
 i.e. 40% according to the 2005 NEA/IEA report, The Projected Costs of Generating Electricity. 
15
 i.e. 0.86 tCO2/MWh according to the same source as above. 
16
 i.e. 55% according to the same source as above. 
17
 i.e. 0.36 tCO2/MWh according to the same source as above. 
18
 Note their study covers a shorter time-period, going from January 1, 2005 to November 30, 2005. 
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Figure 7: Brent ICE Prices from July 2005 to November 2007 
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream 
 
 Let us discuss next weather influences on the EUA price formation. 
 
4.3 Extreme Weather Events 
Weather conditions have an impact on EUA price changes by influencing energy 
demand. Previous literature focuses on the most important dimension of weather: extremely hot 
and cold degree-days (Roll (1984)). Besides, we discuss the non-linearity of the relationship 
between temperatures and carbon price changes. 
Weather influences may be captured by using the daily data of Powernext Weather 
indices (expressed in °C) for four countries: Spain, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
These indices are computed as the temperature average at the representative regional weather 
station weighted by regional population: 
∑
∑
=
=
Θ
=Θ N
i
i
N
i
ii
pop
pop
1
1
*
 (3) 
with N the number of regions in the country under consideration, popi the population of region i, 
and Θi the average temperature of region i during the month under consideration in °C.  
15 
 
The European temperature index published by Tendances Carbone19 may also be used. 
It is equal to the average of national temperatures indices provided by Powernext weighted by 
the share of each NAP in the previous four countries: 
∑
∑
=
=
Θ
= 4
1
4
1
*
j
j
j
j
j
Q
Q
T  (4) 
 
with Qj the number of allowances allocated by the NAP in country j, and Θj the national 
temperature index of country j. The national share of allocation during Phase I in total allocation 
of EUAs are equal to 14.55% for France, 46.40% for Germany, 22.82% for the UK, and 16.23% 
for Spain, according to the European Commission. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: European Temperatures Index from July 2005 to May 2007 
Source: Mission Climat – Caisse des Dépôts 
 
Figure 8 represents the European Temperatures Index from July 2005 to April 2007. To 
take into account extreme weather conditions, Alberola et al. (2008) compute the deviation of 
the temperatures value from their seasonal average expressed in absolute value. They depart 
from previous literature by showing that unanticipated temperatures changes have a statistically 
                                                 
19
 As calculated by the Mission Climat of the Caisse des Depots for Tendances Carbone. The 
methodology is available on the website: 
http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/IMG/pdf\_Document\_Methodologie\_Tendances\_Carbone\_EN\_V4-
2.pdf 
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significant effect on EUA prices only during some specific extreme weather events. During the 
winter 2006, colder temperatures than decennial averages have had a positive impact on EUA 
price changes. Similarly, during the summer 2006 and winter 2007, hotter temperatures have 
affected negatively carbon price changes. The economic rationale behind this analysis is that 
when extremely cold events are colder (hotter) than expected, power generators have to produce 
more (less) than they forecasted, which conducts to an increase (decrease) of allowances 
demand and finally to an increase (decrease) of CO2 price changes. 
In this section, we have identified as CO2 price drivers energy prices, weather events, 
and institutional decisions during 2005-2007. Linked to the influence of political, energy, 
climatic and economic uncertainties on CO2 price changes, we discuss in the next section 
adequate risk-hedging strategies on the EU ETS. 
 
5 Risk-Hedging Strategies 
 
This section deals with the risk-hedging strategies used by firms. Investors naturally 
attempt at hedging against a variation of the risk attached to allowance trading, especially given 
the institutional amendments to the functioning of the scheme. We discuss first the introduction 
of option prices in the EU ETS, and second the consequences on market participants’ hedging 
strategies. 
 
5.1 Carbon-based derivatives products 
Investors need to manage the risk of holding CO2 allowances on the European carbon 
market among a portfolio of diversified investments. As on financial markets, the uses of 
derivatives products allow to reduce the risk of a position on emissions markets. Indeed, the 
European Climate Exchange launched on October 2006 derivatives products trading carbon 
allowances as the underlying asset. 
Figure 9 displays option prices available along with several strikes from October 2006 
to October 2007 on ECX. As detailed in Section 2.4, ECX is the most liquid trading platform 
with approximately 86.5% of the total exchange-based trades of allowances. The underlying 
assets of the contracts are first and second period spot prices. The maturity of the contracts 
typically range from December 2008 to 2013, Phase II contracts (2008-2012) being more 
actively traded than post-Kyoto contracts. Option prices on the carbon market lead to pricing 
errors that are usual for commodity or equity markets. On such a commodity market, the easiest 
way to hedge against the risk of allowance price changes is by selling calls: call prices are more 
actively traded than puts.  
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Figure 9: Option prices available along with several strikes from October 2006 to October 
2007. 
Source: ECX 
 
Since option prices transfer the risk of financial exposure between market agents, we 
further detail in the next section agents’ behaviour with respect to risk on this newly created 
commodity derivatives market.  
  
5.2 Investors’ risk aversion 
Chevallier et al. (2009) estimate changes in investors’ risk aversion on the European 
carbon market around the 2006 compliance event20. They recover investors' risk aversion by 
using the existing relationship with the risk-neutral and historic probabilities. This methodology 
has proved to be robust for stock markets. First, the risk-neutral distribution is recovered from 
ECX option prices. Second, the historical distribution is approximated by the historical return 
distribution of futures allowance prices. Third, the risk aversion is obtained as a by-product 
(Leland (1980)). 
 
                                                 
20
 Given the central role played by the 2005 compliance event highlighted in Section 3.1, we focus on the 
2006 compliance event, which is the only event empirically observable following the introduction of 
options trading on ECX. 
18 
 
 
Figure 10: Changes in the Risk Neutral Distribution for the December 2008 Futures 
Contract. 
Source: Chevallier et al. (2009) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Changes in the Risk Neutral Distribution for the December 2009 Futures 
Contract. 
Source: Chevallier et al. (2009) 
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Figure 12: Changes in the Implied Volatility for the December 2008 Futures Contract. 
Source: Chevallier et al. (2009) 
Note: the blue line denotes the risk neutral density before the 2006 compliance event, while the red line 
denotes the risk neutral density after this institutional event. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Changes in the Implied Volatility for the December 2009 Futures Contract. 
Source: Chevallier et al. (2009) 
Note: the blue line denotes the risk neutral density before the 2006 compliance event, while the red line 
denotes the risk neutral density after this institutional event. 
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Figures 10 and 11 represent changes in the risk neutral distribution for the futures 
contracts of maturity, respectively, December 2008 and December 2009. For both figures, the 
blue line denotes the risk neutral density before the 2006 compliance event, while the red line 
denotes the risk neutral density after this institutional event. The blue line has a steeper slope 
than the red line, which induces more volatility. These results are consistent with the role of 
information in lowering volatility on financial markets. 
Figures 12 and 13 represent changes in the implied volatility for the futures contracts of 
maturity, respectively, December 2008 and December 2009. These two figures illustrate the 
dramatic changes in investor’s risk aversion around the 2006 compliance event, as the implied 
volatilities exhibit dramatically different slopes depending on the sample considered. By 
extracting the information contained in option and futures prices, these results uncover a 
dramatic shift in investors' anticipation around the 2006 compliance event. 
 Overall, this study provides an efficient tool to quantify the effects of risk aversion on 
the European carbon market which, during the period under consideration, has been higher than 
on the stock market. This situation underlines the necessity for investors to manage adequately 
the risk attached to holding CO2 allowances. With the start of Phase II on a sound institutional 
framework, risk aversion on the European carbon market is likely to tend progressively towards 
the values found on stock markets. 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
This article reviews the market rules of the European carbon market during 2005-2007. 
The synthesis of theoretical and empirical approaches developed here has been fruitful for the 
analysis of banking, pricing and risk-hedging strategies. These results teach us that institutional 
learning has indeed occurred within Phase I, both from the viewpoint of market agents and the 
regulator. 
The banking restrictions enforced between December 2007 and January 2008 in the EU 
ETS led to the disconnection between spot prices valid during Phase I, which plummeted to 
zero, and futures prices valid during Phase II, which remained stable around €20 throughout the 
period. This particular episode of the EU ETS highlights the necessity to understand the 
underlying mechanisms of CO2 price changes. 
Like other commodity markets, the amount of allowances available for trading and thus 
the EUA price are driven by the balance between supply and demand (energy prices, weather 
variables, etc.), and other factors related to market structure and institutional policies. Decision 
changes within the regulatory environment have a sharp market effect on allowance prices of all 
maturities. These structural breaks may be statistically identified within the time series of 
carbon prices, and are linked to yearly compliance events and to official communications by the 
European Commission. Besides, it is possible to isolate the influence of carbon price 
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fundamentals linked to energy prices and extreme weather events, which varies before and after 
institutional events. 
Carbon allowances therefore form another asset in commodities against which 
industrials and brokers need to hedge. Studies based on methods used on stock markets prove to 
be robust in quantifying changes in investors’ anticipations.  
Overall, this article highlights the inefficiencies following the creation of the European 
carbon market that prevented the emergence of a price signal leading to effective emissions 
reductions by industrials. The early design inefficiencies of the European carbon market, linked 
to initial allocation or the inter-period transfer of allowances, seem to have been corrected for 
the period 2008-2012, thereby limiting the transfer of inefficiencies towards Phase II. 
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